Articles Tagged with securities lawyer

The Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities requested that Securities America Inc. (Securities America) provide information concerning customer purchases of non-traded real estate investment trust (REIT) securities by Pennsylvania residents since 2007.  This information was provided by an annual report of Ladenburg Thalmann & Co. Inc. (Ladenburg Thalmann), the company that owns Securities America as well as two other independent broker-dealers.  According to Ladenburg Thalmann the company is unable to determine whether and the extent that the Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities may seek to discipline Securities America

A REIT is a corporation or trust that owns income-producing real estate properties.  REITs pool the capital of numerous investors to purchase a portfolio of properties that may include office building, shopping centers, hotels, and apartment buildings that the average investor would not otherwise be able to purchase individually.  Publicly traded REITs can be sold on an exchange and have the same liquidity as most stocks and bonds.  However, non-traded REITs are sold only through broker-dealers and are illiquid.  REITs are typically long term investments and investors should be prepared to hold onto non-traded REITs for up to 7 to 10 years and even longer under some circumstances.

The non-traded REIT industry sales doubled last year to $20 billion, from 2012.  Increased volatility in the stock market during the financial crisis led investment advisors to increasingly recommend REITs as a purported stable investment during unstable times.  However, the stability of non-traded REITs only exists because brokerage firms and issuers have control over the value how the value of the security is listed on an investor’s account statements and not because the security will actually sell at that value.  The risks of non-traded REITs are significant and FINRA has issued an Investor Alert warning investors of some of the potential risks.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) sanctioned Centaurus Financial, Inc., (Centaurus) concerning allegations that Centaurus failed to supervise the business activities of five representative in the dissemination of communications concerning the risks of certain private placements.  FINRA fined the firm $25,000

Centaurus became a FINRA member firm in 1993 and is headquartered in Anaheim California.  The firm has 367 branch offices and approximately 585 registered individuals.  The firm operates as a privately held independent broker-dealer and engages in various securities businesses including corporate and municipal debt, mutual funds, direct investments, and private placements.

FINRA alleged that at various times during from February 2009, through January 2010, five Centaurus registered representatives functioned as wholesalers for an unaffiliated investment management firm. FINRA alleged that Centaurus written supervisory procedures did not address the supervision of wholesaling activities and Centaurus did not supervise the wholesaling activities of the five representatives in violation of NASD Rule 3010. FINRA found that the five representatives did not use their Centaurus e-mails for wholesaling activities and instead used the investment management firm’s email address to send communications.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) fined Barclays Capital Inc. (Barclays) $3.75 million for systemic failures relating to the failure to preserve electronic records, emails, and instant messages in the manner required for a period of at least 10 years.  The retention of electronic correspondence and records is critical for the proper supervision of brokerage activities.  Without a proper record retention system, brokerage firms are essentially blind to certain types of securities misconduct.

Federal securities laws and FINRA rules require that business electronic records must be kept in non-rewritable, non-erasable format — also referred to as “Write-Once, Read-Many” or “WORM” format — to prevent alteration.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has stated that a firm’s books and records are the primary means of monitoring compliance with the securities laws.

FINRA found that from at least 2002 to 2012, Barclays failed to preserve many of its required electronic books and records—including order and trade ticket data, trade confirmations, blotters, and account records in WORM format.  FINRA found that Barclays retention failures were widespread and included all of the firm’s business areas.  Thus, FINRA alleged that Barclays was unable to determine whether all of its electronic books and records were maintained in an unaltered condition.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) ordered J.P. Turner & Company, L.L.C. (JP Turner) to pay $707,559 in restitution to 84 customers for sales of unsuitable leveraged and inverse exchange-traded funds (Non-Traditional ETFs) and for excessive mutual fund switches.  The current fine and is just one of several sanctions that regulators have brought against JP Turner brokers concerning the firms sales and supervisory practices.

Brad Bennett, FINRA Executive Vice President and Chief of Enforcement, was quoted in the settlement stating that “Securities firms and their registered reps must understand the complex products they are selling and the risks inherent to the products, and be able to determine if they are suitable for investors before recommending them to retail customers.”

As a background, Non-Traditional ETFs are novel products that have grown significantly in popularity since 2006.  By 2009, over 100 Non-Traditional ETFs existed in the market place with total assets of approximately $22 billion.  A leveraged ETF seeks to deliver two or three times an index or benchmark return the ETF tracks.  Non-Traditional ETFs can also be “inverse” or “short” meaning that the investment returns the opposite of the performance the index or benchmark.  While both ETFs and Non-Traditional ETFs track indexes, Non-Traditional ETFs contain significant risks that are not associated with traditional ETFs.   Non-Traditional ETFs have additional risks of daily reset, use of leverage, and compounding.

Most investors know that their financial advisor cannot misrepresent the risks and rewards of investments.  However, many investors do not realize that all brokers have an obligation to deal fairly with investors by only recommending suitable investments or investment strategies.  All sales efforts are judged by the ethical standards of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that sets industry wide investment standards.  The “suitability rule” contains three primary obligations: reasonable-basis, customer-specific, and quantitative suitability.

Reasonable-basis suitability means that the broker must believe, based on appropriate research and due diligence, that the product or strategy being recommended is suitable for at least some investors.  Thus, FINRA recognizes that there are some investment products and strategies that are so risky and likely to fail that they would be inappropriate for all investors.  Other investments may contain risks characteristics that are only appropriate for a very small group of investors or for specialized purposes.

Customer-specific suitability requires the broker to believe that the recommended investment strategy is suitable for that particular customer. The advisor must take into consideration the customer’s risk tolerance, investment objectives, age, financial circumstances, other investment holdings, experience, and other information provided to the broker.

As we have reported, claims of churning, excessive trading, and failure to supervise have plagued J.P. Turner & Company, L.L.C. (JP Turner) brokers, among other misconduct.  Recently, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) imposed sanctions against Herman Mannings (Mannings), a JP Turner supervisor, concerning allegations that from February 2009, through October 2011, Mannings failed to reasonably supervise the activities of a registered representative to prevent unsuitable mutual fund switching.

On August 20, 2002, Mannings became registered with JP Turner.  On February 10, 2003, Mannings was registered as a General Securities Principal at JP Turner.  FINRA’s supervisory rule provides that each brokerage firm must establish, maintain, and enforce written procedures to supervise the types of business it engages in.  Supervision of registered representatives, registered principals, and other associated persons must be reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations.

FINRA found that from February 2009, through October 2011, Mannings was an Area Vice President for JP Turner and his responsibilities included the supervision of at least 30 branch offices and as many as 60 representatives. According to FINRA, a registered representative referred to as only by the initials “LG” was one of the representatives that Mannings supervised. FINRA found that LG effected approximately 335 unsuitable mutual fund switches in the accounts of 54 customers without having reasonable grounds for believing that such transactions were suitable for those customers.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) imposed a permanent bar against Gary J. Chackman (Chackman) concerning allegations that he recommended unsuitable transactions in the accounts of at least eight LPL Financial, Inc. (LPL) customers by over-concentrating the customers’ assets in real estate investment trusts (REITs).  Additionally, FINRA found that Chackman falsified LPL documents to evade the firm’s supervision by submitting dozens of “alternative investment purchase” forms that misrepresented customers’ liquid net worth.  FINRA found that by submitting falsified documents Chackman increased his customers’ accounts’ concentration in REITs and other alternative investments beyond the firm’s maximum allocation limits.

From December 2001, through March 2012, Chackman was registered through LPL.  On March 2012, LPL filed a Uniform Termination Notice for (Form U5) stating that Chackman was terminated for violating firm policies and procedures regarding the sale of alternative investments.  From March 2, 2012 through April 3, 2013, Chackman was registered through Summit Brokerage Services, Inc. (Summit). In April 2013, Summit filed a Form U5 terminating Chackman stating that the broker was operating a business out of an unregistered location.  According to Chackman’s BrokerCheck there have been at least five customer complaints filed against the broker.  Many of the complaints involve allegations of unsuitable REITs

According to FINRA, from July 2009 to February 2012, Chackman recommended REITs and other alternative investments to at least eight of his LPL customers.  FINRA found that Chackman purchased the REITs at periodic intervals in each of their accounts.  For example, in one customer’s account Chackman made seven purchases of a particular REIT, each for $75,000 over six months. After twelve months, FINRA found that 35% of the customer’s assets and more than 25% of her liquid net worth were invested in REITs and other alternative investments.  In order to evade LPL’s limitation on the concentration of alternative investments in customers’ accounts, FINRA found that Chackman misidentified his customers’ purported liquid net worth on LPL forms. FINRA found that over sixteen months and on seventeen alternative investment purchase forms Chackman tripled the customer’s purported liquid net worth.

One of the most common questions I receive as a FINRA securities attorney is whether or not a client is likely to prevail at a FINRA arbitration hearing.  My first gut reaction, and the one I tell clients, is honestly I just don’t know.  Most clients are puzzled by this answer because after handling hundreds of arbitration claims one would think I would have a better sense and certainty as to the strength of the case.  However, the answer to whether the client would win at arbitration is not just a function of the strength of the case.

The better way to phrase the question is: What is the likely outcome of my securities case?  That question is more readily answerable.  I tell clients that it has been our experience that approximately 80% of all cases filed will be resolved through settlement or other means sometime prior to hearing.  Recent data released by FINRA supports that approximately 80% of cases never make it to hearing.  According to FINRA, of all arbitrations decided between 2009 and 2013 between 75% and 79% of those claims are resolved either through settlement, withdrawn, or means other than a hearing.

But what of the 20% of cases that do go to hearing?  What are the chances of success at the FINRA arbitration hearing?  The answer to that question is again usually unknowable at the time it’s first asked.  There are so many considerations that go into determining the likelihood of success, many of which are unknown at the outset.  Once of the biggest unknowns at the outset is who the arbitrators will be.

The Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE), in coordination with other Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff released guidance and observations concerning investment advisers due diligence process for selecting alternative investments.  The OCIE has observed that investment advisers are increasingly recommending alternative investments to their clients in lieu of other investment options.  Investment advisers are fiduciaries and must act in their clients’ best interests.  Since an investment adviser exercises discretion to purchase alternative investments on behalf of clients the adviser must determine whether the investments: (i) meet the clients’ investment objectives; and (ii) are consistent with the investment principles and strategies that were disclosed to the client by the manager to the adviser.

Alternative investments include a variety of non-traditional investments including hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, real estate, and funds of private funds.  The commonality amongst alternative investments is that they employ unique investment strategies and assets that are not necessarily correlated to traditional stock and bond indexes.

The OCIE staff examined the due diligence process processes of advisers to pension plans and funds of private funds in order to evaluate how advisers performed due diligence, identify, disclose, and mitigate conflicts of interest, and evaluate complex investment strategies and fund structures.  The OCIE noted indicators that led advisers to conduct additional due diligence analysis, request the manager to make appropriate changes, or to reject the manager or the alternative investment.

You’ve gone over your account statements and start to suspect that your broker hasn’t invested your assets appropriately.  What should you do?  The first step is to compile all of your documents and correspondence with your broker.  You should collect your monthly account statements, opening account documents, and any written communication with your brokerage firm for starters. This will make it easier to assess your case.

Next, you should consult with an attorney. While not required, when you have securities claim, brokerage firms rarely settle claims with individuals without the assistance of an attorney.  Most securities claims must be brought in arbitration  before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the broker-dealer regulator.  A securities attorney can represent you during the arbitration or mediation proceedings and provide direction and advice on how to present your claim.  Even if you do not choose to hire an attorney, brokerage firms usually hire counsel to represent them.  If you cannot afford an attorney, many law firms offer contingency fee arrangements.

The SEC provides the following advice on finding an attorney who specializes in resolving securities complaints. If you need help in finding a lawyer who specializes in resolving securities complaints, you may want to try the following:

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