securities attorney

Equipment Leasing Programs LEAF and ICON: Too Costly to Invest In

December 23, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

Our firm has written numerous times about investor losses in programs such as various equipment leasing programs like LEAF Equipment Leasing Income Funds I-IV and ICON Leasing Funds Eleven and Twelve. These direct participation programs, like their non-traded REIT and oil and gas cousins, all suffer from the same crippling flaw that dooms these investments to a high likelihood of failure from the get go. The costs and fees associated with all of these investments cause the security to be so costly that only unprecedented market boom conditions can lead to profitability. Market stagnation or decline makes any significant return a virtual impossibility.

Yet, investors are in no way compensated for these additional risks. These investments tout high yield like returns for risks far in excess of traditional high yield investments. In fact, the only reason brokers sell these products is because of the high sales commissions coupled with the lack of price transparency that allows these products to be displayed at inflated values for years on investor account statements.

In an equipment leasing program a sponsor sells limited partnership units then takes out substantial offering costs and fees and invests the remainder in a pool of equipment leases that are leveraged up with additional borrowing. Brokers market these products as a predictable income stream but in fact, and what nearly all brokers fail to mention, is that a substantial portion of investor distributions are actually a return of their original investment and not actually income generated from operations.

Securities America Broker James McLaughlin Sanctioned Over Churning Allegations

December 22, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) recently sanctioned Securities America, Inc. (Securities America) broker James McLaughlin (McLaughlin) alleging that between October 2010, through October 2012, McLaughlin: (i) engaged in excessive trading (churning) in four customers’ accounts; (ii) recommended unsuitable short-term trading of mutual funds in four customers’ accounts; (iii) engaged in unauthorized trading in three customers’ accounts and; (iv) exercised discretion in one customer’s account without having written authorization.

McLaughlin was registered as a broker from 1989 until October 2012. McLaughlin was registered with Securities America from October 2000, until October 2012. On October 29, 20l2, Securities America terminated McLaughlin’s registrations for violating firm policies and procedures relating to excessive trading.

FINRA alleged that McLaughlin excessively traded at least four customers’ accounts. By analyzing the number of trades, turnover rate, and cost-to-equity ratio for these accounts FINRA determined that across a two-year relevant period from October 2010, through October 2012 that the accounts were excessively traded. In one account 286 purchase and sale transactions occurred resulting in a turnover rate of 47.63 and a cost-to-equity ratio of 228.03%. In a second account 459 purchase and sale transactions occurred resulting in a turnover rate of 15.86 and a cost-to-equity ratio of 69.54%. In a third account FINRA alleged that McLaughlin executed 140 purchase and sale transactions resulting in a turnover rate of 6.79 and a cost-to-equity ratio of 32.74%. Finally, in fourth customer’s account FINRA found McLaughlin executed 111 purchase and sale transactions resulting in a turnover rate of 8.75 and a cost-to-equity ratio of 44.50%.

FINRA Alleges SWS Financial Services Failed to Supervise Variable Annuity Transactions

December 19, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) filed a complaint against brokerage firm SWS Financial Services, Inc. (SWS Financial) over allegations that from September 2009, to May 2011, SWS Financial had inadequate supervisory systems procedures to supervise its variable annuity (VA) securities business. Specifically, FINRA alleged that SWS Financial: (1) failed to establish and maintain supervisory systems to supervise its VA securities business in violation of NASD and FINRA Rules; (2) failed to implement rules requiring a registered principal review and approval prior to transmission of a VA application to the issuing insurance company for processing and that a registered principal only approve VA transactions that he or she has determined that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the transaction is suitable for the customer; (3) failed to implement surveillance procedures to monitor a broker’s recommended exchanges of VAs to identify inappropriate exchanges; (4) failed to have policies and procedures to implement corrective measures to address inappropriate VA exchanges; and (5) failed to develop and document specific training policies or programs to ensure that principals supervisors who reviewed VA transactions had sufficient knowledge to monitor the transactions.

SWS Financial is a registered broker/dealer since 1986 and is headquartered in Dallas, Texas. The firm employs 313 registered personnel. From September 2009, to May 2011, SWS Financial derived the majority of its income from its business lines selling equities, mutual funds, variable life insurance or annuities, and municipal securities.

FINRA alleged that from September 2009, to May 2011, SWS Financial derived 16% to 20% of its total revenues from sales of VAs to customers. However, despite this fact, FINRA alleged that SWS Financial failed to establish and implement adequate supervisory systems for this aspect of its securities business. FINRA alleged that the firm’s brokers sold VAs both in branch offices where a registered branch manager was onsite as well as in offices where there was no onsite supervisor. FINRA alleged that the firms procedures required that VA transactions initiated by representatives in branch offices with a branch manager were reviewed and approved by the banch manager and then forwarded to SWS Financial’s home office for final review and approval employees at an affiliated insurance company, Southwest Insurance Agency (Insurance Agency).

Aegis Capital Corp. Broker Malcom Segal Barred From Industry Over Allegations of Outside Business Activities

December 14, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) recently barred former Aegis Capital Corp. (Aegis) broker Malcom Segal (Segal) alleging that Segal may have engaged in unauthorized transfers of funds from customer accounts to an outside business activities (a/k/a “selling away”).

According to Segal’s BrokerCheck, Segal was registered with Cumberland Brokerage Corporation from 1989 until April 2011. Thereafter, Segal was a broker for Aegis until July 2014 where he was terminated on allegations of by the firm violations of the firm that Segal failed to cooperate with an internal investigation into a customer complaint he made unauthorized wire transfers from a customer’s account. Segal’s disclosures also reveal that he is listed as a partner of J & M Financial and President of National C.D. Sales.

Upon information and belief, it is in connection with National C.D. Sales that customer have filed complaints against Segal concerning. While details concerning Segal’s activities are still pending, the allegations against Cox are consistent with a “selling away” securities violation. Selling away occurs when a financial advisor solicits investments in companies or promissory notes that were not approved by the broker’s affiliated firm. In many cases the broker transfers funds or liquidates investments at his registered firm in order to make the investment in the outside business.

Global Brokerage Services Fined Over Misleading Account Statements

December 12, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), in an acceptance, waiver, and consent action (AWC), sanctioned brokerage firm Global Brokerage Services, Inc. (Global) over allegations that from approximately February 2011, to August 2013, Global failed to establish and enforce a reasonable supervisory system regarding the use of consolidated reports by registered brokers with the firm. FINRA found that Global’s brokers provided consolidated reports to their customers that lacked required disclosures and/or contained misleading information. ln addition, FINRA alleged that one the brokers disseminated consolidated reports that included his own inaccurate and potentially misleading valuations for non-traded REITs and other illiquid investments.

Global has been a FINRA member since 1995, employs fourteen registered representatives, and its main office is in Hunt Valley, Maryland.

FINRA found that certain of Global’s brokers created consolidated reports using Morningstar or Excel for distribution to their customers. FINRA alleged that Global failed to have written supervisory procedures specific to consolidated reports. Instead, FINRA determined that consolidated reports at Global were treated as correspondence requiring only a sample (10%) be reviewed on a quarterly basis.

Cantella & Co. Accused of Overcharging Client Commissions

December 11, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), in an acceptance, waiver, and consent action (AWC), sanctioned brokerage firm Cantella & Co., Inc. (Cantella) over allegations that from approximately January 2006, to September 2011, the firm charged customers excessive commissions on approximately 1,270 equity transactions and 99 options transactions. FINRA also found that Cantella also failed to establish, maintain, and enforce an adequate supervisory system for the review of commissions charged.

Cantella has been a member of FINRA since 1983, the firm’s principal office is located in Boston, MA, and currently employs approximately 210 registered representatives working out of the principal office and 136 branch offices.

NASD Conduct Rule 2440 provides that all brokerage firms shall buy or sell at a security at a price which is fair, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances. The NASD established a policy that a mark-up of five percent may be deemed unreasonable and this policy applies equally to commissions on agency trades, and to mark-ups or mark-downs on principal transactions. In addition to the commission percentage other factors to be considered in determining the fairness of commission charges include: (i) the type of security involved; (ii) the availability of the security; (iii) the price of the security; (iv) the size of the transaction; (v) whether disclosure of the transaction cost was made to the customer prior to the trade’s execution; (vi) pattern of mark-ups; and (vii) the nature of the member’s business.

Why Your Broker Asking You to Sign A Comfort Letter is A Big Misconduct Red Flag

December 8, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

Your brokerage firm reviews customer accounts for misconduct and what does it find; bizarre and unreasonable trading activity. Maybe dozens of trades are being made every month or an account previously invested in plain vanilla mutual funds is now loaded up with speculative penny stocks and private placements. Whatever the cause, the firm has a system to monitor for unusual trading activity and sends the customer a letter. These letters go by many names including “happiness”, “comfort”, and more appropriately “Cover You’re A@!” (CYA).

A recent article by the Wall Street Journal explored how the purpose of these letters is to elicit an acknowledgment from the customer that they are satisfied with how the account is being handled in order to minimize future liability from a suit concerning the wrongful activity. To clarify, when a brokerage firm finds indications of possible misconduct their first action isn’t to stop the misconduct and help their client but to get the client to release the firm from liability.

Having reviewed dozens of these letters myself they are designed to be unreadable to the average investor and use industry jargon and legal lingo that is indecipherable to anyone but a securities attorney. These letters begin warmly enough by thanking you for your business and hoping that everything is well with you. Then the conversation becomes impersonal and maybe mentions that your investment choices have become more risky or aggressive recently. These sentences are code words for your investment objectives have completely changed from generating retirement income to you are now interested in potentially losing all your money with casino level risk. Maybe some information related to a “cost-to-equity ratio” or “turnover” is given. There is no explanation as to what these terms mean or why you should be concerned because they are just being provided for legal reasons that the customer should be unconcerned with.

FINRA Sanctions Essex Securities for Failing to Supervise Mutual Fund Switching

December 4, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), in an acceptance, waiver, and consent action (AWC), sanctioned brokerage firm Essex Securities, LLC (Essex Securities) alleging that from February 2010, through March 2011, Essex Securities through one of its brokers violated industry rules by engaging in a pattern of unsuitable mutual fund switching, a form of churning, in the accounts of seven customers. Further, FINRA found that Essex Securities violated FINRA’ supervisory rules by failing to establish and maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to prevent unsuitable mutual fund switching.

Essex has been a FINRA member broker-dealer since 1998, is headquartered in Topsfield, MA, and conducts a general securities business with approximately 50 brokers out of 26 branch offices.

FINRA alleged that an Essex Securities broker engaged in a pattern of unsuitable mutual fund switching in seven customer accounts by not having reasonable grounds for believing that such transactions were suitable for those customers due to the frequency of the transactions and the transaction costs incurred. Part of the suitability rule requires brokers to take into consideration the cost consequences of the transactions and ensure that there is a reasonable basis for the incurring of such costs. In this case, FINRA found that on at least 29 occasions, the broker recommended that customers sell mutual funds within only one to thirteen months after purchasing them. Essex Securities was found to have earned commissions of approximately $60,000 on these switch transactions and broker himself was paid approximately $54,000.

FINRA Sanctions Ameriprise Over Arbitration Discovery Abuse Part II

December 2, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

In the prior post we discussed the extremely difficult journey an investor may have to go through in order to obtain relevant discovery documents from the brokerage industry in FINRA arbitration. We also discussed how the system is stacked against the investor’s rights and provides incentives to firms to withhold documents. However, a recent FINRA enforcement order provides some hope that the regulatory watchdog will start taking these issues seriously.

In October 2014, FINRA sanctioned Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. (Ameriprise) and its broker for altering documents and refusing to produce documents until the eve of hearing. FINRA’s action resulted from the discovery tactics employed by Ameriprise and its broker David Tysk (Tysk) in a FINRA arbitration.

In the Ameriprise case, the FINRA arbitrators found the firm’s conduct so egregious that it referred the matter to FINRA’s Member Regulation Department. The arbitration panel found that Ameriprise and Tysk produced documents in an arbitration proceeding without disclosing that Tysk had altered the documents after receiving a complaint letter from a customer. The altered documents were printouts of notes of Tysk’s contacts with the customer having the initials “GR.” Tysk was responsible for detailing his contact with customers in a computer system maintained by Ameriprise.

Is FINRA Ready to Get Serious About Arbitration Discovery Abuse? Part I

December 1, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

Many securities arbitration attorneys would agree that discovery abuse in FINRA arbitration is a problem under certain circumstances. A client has a seemingly great and compelling case. Then the brokerage firm produces its “discovery” but something doesn’t seem right. Documents recording decisions on key dates are missing, there are unexpected gaps in the email record, and in the worst cases your client has produced documents that the firm should have a copy of but for some reason does not. How often discovery abuse happens in FINRA arbitration is unknowable.

However, what is known is that system likely fosters discovery abuse. A recent Reuters article highlighted that arbitrators do indeed go easy on brokerage firm discovery abuse. Why does this happen? The first line of defense against discovery abuse is the arbitrators themselves. But most arbitrators simply expect the parties to comply with their discovery obligations without their input. Moreover, arbitrators loath ordering parties to produce documents against their will and prefer the parties to resolve their own disputes. While these goals are noble they also invite abuse.

So how does an investor ultimately get awarded discovery abuse sanctions if a brokerage firm fails to produce documents? First, the client must move to compel the documents and win the motion over the brokerage firm’s objections. Second, the firm must refuse to comply with the order. Usually the firm will interpret the scope of the order as not encompassing the discovery that was actually ordered or will otherwise declaw the order through claims of “privilege” or “confidentiality.” This leads to a second motion to compel and request for sanctions. Again the investor will have to argue the relevance of the initial request as if the panel never ruled that these documents had been ordered to be produced and the brokerage firm gets a second bite of the apple to throw out the discovery.