FINRA

FINRA Updates

September 30, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

On September 25, 2014, FINRA published its third quarter “Neutral Corner,” a newsletter designed to give practitioners, investors, and arbitrators updates on FINRA news. In the newsletter, FINRA officially announced the retirement of Linda Feinberg, President of FINRA Dispute Resolution. Ms. Feinberg has worked with FINRA since 1996. In addition, the newsletter highlights increased arbitrator disclosures. As of 2013, FINRA has increased its scrutiny of arbitrator disclosure by conducting internet searches of all arbitrators before having them appointed to panels.

Finally, FINRA highlights its new DR Portal – a web-based program designed to streamline the arbitration process for both attorneys and arbitrators. This is part of FINRA’s initiative to go paperless in the 21st century.

LPL Financial Fined For Failure to Properly Supervise Variable Annuities Transactions

September 26, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

LPL Financial was recently fined $2 million and ordered to pay $820,000 in restitution, for violations pertaining to variable annuity exchanges. This settlement, which was reached with the Illinois Securities Department, resulted from LPL’s inadequate maintenance of books and records with regards to documenting 1035 exchanges. A 1035 Exchange is a tax-free exchange of an existing annuity contract for a new one. In order for the new contract to qualify as a Section 1035 Exchange, the policyholder must have exchanged his or her existing contract for an equivalent new contract. The annuitant or policyholder must also remain the same.

According to LPL’s BrokerCheck file, LPL “failed to enforce its supervisory system and procedures in connection with the documentation of certain salespersons’ variable annuity exchange activities.” LPL has indicated that it will seek to enhance its procedures relating to surrender charges that often result from variable annuity exchange transactions. This, LPL believes, would ensure accuracy in their books and records along with client disclosures.

The product at issue was variable annuities, which have been closely watched by regulators dues to the complexity of the product and high fee structures. Elderly investors have often been sold variable annuities, when they were entirely unsuitable, just so that brokers could earn increased commissions. Regulators have paid especially close attention to those advisors who have switched their clients from one variable annuity to another, just to enhance their commissions.

FINRA Sanctions B. C. Ziegler and Company For Failure to Supervise Church Bond Sales (Part II)

September 12, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

This post picks up on our first article on The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) sanctioning brokerage firm B. C. Ziegler and Company (B. C. Ziegler) and ordering the brokerage firm to pay $150,000 on allegations that the firm failed to implement a supervisory system reasonably designed to ensure that material economic information regarding Church Bonds was disclosed to the firm’s brokers, trading desk, and customers.

FINRA found that while the firm maintained a Credit Watch List to check for delinquent and missed Church Bond payments, this list was only produced periodically and not every time a Church Bond issuer fell five weeks behind on its sinking fund payments. Accordingly, FINRA found that B. C. Ziegler violated NASD Rule 3010 by failing to establish and maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to ensure that material economic information, such as delinquent sinking fund payments, was disclosed to the firm’s brokers and customers who were sold Church Bonds in secondary market transactions.

FINRA found that prior to September 2010, B. C. Ziegler did not inform its brokers, trading desk, or customers when an issuer was more than 30 days behind on its sinking fund payments, an indicator of financial distress. Further, it was alleged that from September 2010, through at least May 2012, B. C. Ziegler’s registered representatives and trading desk were informed only periodically when a Church Bond issuer fell five weeks behind on its sinking fund payments through the Credit Watch List causing B.C. Ziegler’s supervisory system to not be reasonably designed to consider material economic information in the pricing of Church Bonds in secondary market transactions. The result, FINRA found, was that the firm had similar pricing for secondary market trades in Church Bonds that were current and delinquent with sinking fund payments.

optionsXpress, Inc. Sanctioned Over Allegations of Unlicensed Securities Sales

September 5, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) sanctioned brokerage firm optionsXpress, Inc. (optionsXpress) concerning allegations that: 1) between March 2007, and March 2012, optionsXpress contracted with a third party service provider referred to as (GBT) to provide options trading coaching services to the firm’s options customers; 2) the firm approved marketing scripts that were used by GBT to sell the coaching program to optionsXpress customers that failed to present a fair and balanced description of the risks and potential benefits of the coaching program; and 3) between April 2011, and July 2011, the firm operated a retail forex business without having first received approval from FINRA to do so.

optionsXpress has been a FINRA firm since August 2000. The firm is primarily an online broker-dealer that specializes in providing customers an online platform to trade options.

FINRA found that under the terms of the firm’s Agreement with GBT coaches were prohibited from advising clients in live trading situations. The agreement provided that GBT coaches are vigorously trained on the absolute prohibition of making buy/sell recommendations to students. However, FINRA found that in implementing the coaching program, GBT’s coaches did not uniformly adhere to this prohibition and in certain instances coaches discussed live trades, specific transactions, or strategies that the customer was considering executing. Even though coaching sessions were prefaced with the disclaimer that coaches were not permitted to make buy, sell, or hold recommendations, FINRA determined that in certain sessions, the “coaching” surpassed mere discussions of specific securities transactions, and rose to the level of buy, sell, or hold recommendations.

FINRA Fines Merrill Lynch For Overcharging Mutual Fund Customers

July 17, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

On June 16, 2014, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) announced that it fined Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. $8 million for charging excessive fees relating to the sales of mutual funds in retirement accounts. FINRA also ordered Merrill Lynch to pay $24.4 million in restitution to those customers who had been wrongfully overcharged. The mandated restitution was in addition to the $64 million Merrill Lynch has already paid to compensate disadvantaged investors.

Mutual funds offer several different classes of shares. Each class has separate and distinct sales charges and fees. Generally, Class A shares have the lowest fees as compared to Class B and Class C. Class A shares, however, charge customers an upfront sales charge. This initial sales charge, however, is usually waived for retirement accounts, with some funds also waiving these fees for charities.

Merrill Lynch’s retail platform offers a variety of different mutual funds. Most of those funds explicitly offered to waive the upfront sales charges and disclosed those waivers in their respective prospectuses. According to FINRA, despite these disclosures, Merrill Lynch did not actually waive the sales charges many times since at least January 2006. On various occasions, Merrill Lynch charged the full sales charges to certain customers who qualified for the waiver. In doing so, Merrill Lynch allegedly caused nearly 41,000 small business retirement plan accounts and 6,800 charities and 403(b) retirement accounts for ministers and public school employees to pay sales charges when purchasing Class A shares. Those that did not want to pay the fee for the Class A shares were forced to purchase other share classes that needlessly exposed them to greater ongoing costs and fees. According to FINRA, Merrill Lynch became aware of the fact that its small business retirement plan customers were being overcharged, but yet they continued to sell the costly mutual fund shares and never reported the issue to FINRA for over five years.

Bank Loan ETFs – Buyer Beware

July 11, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

A recent statement by BlackRock Inc (BlackRock) Chief Executive Larry Fink concerning leveraged exchange traded funds (Leveraged ETFs) has provoked a chain reaction from the ETF industry. Fink runs BlackRock, the world’s largest ETF provider. Fink’s statement that structural problems with Leveraged ETFs have the potential to “blow up the whole industry one day” have rattled other ETF providers – none more so than those selling bank loan ETFs. Naturally, sponsors of Leveraged ETFs, a $60 billion market, called the remarks an exaggeration.

As a background, leveraged ETFs use a combination of derivatives instruments and debt to multiply returns on an underlining asset, class of securities, or sector index. The leverage employed is designed to generate 2 to 3 times the return of the underlining assets. Leveraged ETFs can also be used to return the inverse or the opposite result of the return of the benchmark. While regular ETFs can be held for long term trading, Leveraged ETFs are generally designed to be used only for short term trading – sometimes as short as a single day’s holding. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has warned that most Leveraged ETFs reset daily and FINRA has stated that Leveraged ETFs are complex products that are typically not suitable for retail investors. In fact, some brokerage firms simply prohibit the solicitation of these investments to its customers, an explicit recognition that a Leveraged ETF recommendation is unsuitable for virtually everyone.

Despite these dangers, bank loan Leveraged ETFs may be an easy sell to investors. Investors in fixed income instruments are compensated based upon the level of two sources of bond risk – duration risk and credit risk. Duration risk takes into account the length of time and is subject to interest rate changes. Credit risk evaluates the credit quality of the issuer. For example, U.S. Treasury’s have virtually no credit risk and investors are compensated based on the length of the bond. At the other end of the safety spectrum are low rated floating-rate debt – what bank loan Leveraged ETFs invest in. These funds are supposed to reset every 90 days in order to get exposure to the credit side but not take on much duration risk.

JP Turner Sanctioned Again By Financial Regulator

June 27, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) sanctioned broker-dealer J.P. Turner & Company, L.L.C. (JP Turner) concerning allegations JP Turner failed to establish and enforce reasonable supervisory procedures to monitor the outside brokerage accounts of its registered representatives. In addition, FINRA alleged that JP Turner failed to establish an escrow account on one contingency offering and broke the escrow without raising the required minimum in bona fide investments.

This isn’t the first time that FINRA has come down on JP Turner’s practices and that our firm has written about the conduct of JP Turner brokers. Those articles can be accessed here (JP Turner Sanctioned By FINRA Over Non-Traditional ETF Sales and Mutual Fund Switches), here (JP Turner Supervisor Sanctioned Over Failure to Supervise Mutual Fund Switches), and here (SEC Finds that Former JP Turner Broker Ralph Calabro Churned A Client’s Account).

JP Turner has been FINRA firm since 1997. JP Turner engages in a wide range of securities transactions including the sale of municipal and corporate debt securities, equities, mutual funds, options, oil and gas interests, private placements, variable annuities, and other direct participation programs. JP Turner employs approximately 422 financial advisors and operates out of 185 branch offices with principal offices in Atlanta, Georgia.

Wells Fargo Advisors Awarded Limited Recovery On Broker Promissory Note

June 18, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

Recently, a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration panel rendered a decision concerning Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC’s (Wells Fargo) claims against its former broker Steven Grundstedt (Grundstedt) for breach of three promissory notes. FINRA Arbitration Case No. 11-02245. The FINRA arbitration panel held that Grundstedt was entitled to an offset against the outstanding balance of the first promissory note dated July 30, 2008 because Wells Fargo, then Wachovia at the time, breached an implied contract and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the contracts Grundstedt signed, causing him substantial economic damage.

Wells Fargo claimed that Grundstedt failed to repay three separate forgivable promissory notes. Note 1 was in the principal amount of $320,000 and constituted a “transitional bonus” Grundstedt was rewarded with for moving his book of business from his former employer, Citigroup. Like the other notes in the litigation, the principal portion of Note 1 could be received in a lump sum or could be taken in monthly installments. In either case, the monthly re-payment of principal and interest was to be offset by the forgiveness of an equivalent amount conditioned upon Grundstedt’s continued employment with Wachovia’s.

According to the order, at the time Grundstedt accepted employment with Wachovia, he signed multiple agreements. One of these agreements promised Grundstedt that he would receive “support” from Wachovia including “re-assignment of accounts, walk-ins, prospective customer leads…” among other forms of company support. The panel found that Wachovia initially lived up to its promises but that the situation changed after Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo. In the fall of 2009, Wells Fargo consolidated operations, closed branches, and changed payouts and various other things designed with the intent to make the overall business more efficient and profitable.

Ameriprise Slammed With $1.17 Million Decision Concerning Tenants-in-Common (TIC) Investments

June 17, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

A Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration panel recently ordered Ameriprise Financial Services Inc. (Ameriprise) to pay two elderly California investors $1.17 for recommending the investments in Tenants-in-Common (TIC), real estate related investments that eventually failed.

Brokerage firms, such as Ameriprise, having increasingly turned to alternative investment products such as TICs in recent years. The sales of TIC interests grew from approximately $150 million in 2001 to approximately $2 billion by 2004. FINRA has warned brokerage firms to put investors on notice of the risks of these illiquid investment for which no secondary market exists. In addition, subsequent sales of TIC property may occur at a discount to the value of the real property interest causing the investor substantial losses. FINRA has also warned that the fces and expenses charged by the TIC sponsor can outweigh the potential tax benefits associated with the IRS Section 1031 Exchange. FINRA requires that all member brokerage firms have an obligation to comply with all applicable conduct rules when selling TICs. These rules include the obligation to conduct proper due diligence and to ensure that promotional materials used are fair, accurate, and balanced.

In a recent InvestmentNews article, it was reported that in May, a FINRA arbitration panel in San Francisco ruled that Ameriprise had inappropriately advised two retired schoolteachers to invest a total of $1.03 million into three TICs in office complexes and hotels in early 2008. One of the TICs has subsequently failed and the two others have suffered declines in value. According to the investors, the couple lost most of their life savings. The couple invested in TICs known as ARI-Onyx Office Plaza Tenant In Common; Moody Springhill Suites Pittsburgh Tenant in Common; and Moody Marriott TownePlace Suites Portland Scarborough Tenant in Common.

Morgan Stanley Fined $5,000,000 For Failure To Supervise Sales of IPO’s

June 16, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

On May 6, 2014, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) announced that it had fined Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC $5,000,000 for failure to properly supervise the solicitation of retail clients to invest in initial public offerings (IPOs). According to FINRA, Morgan Stanley sold shares to its retail customers in eighty-three different IPO’s between February 16, 2012 and May 1, 2013, with insufficient procedures and employee education. Some of the more commonly sold IPOs included Facebook and Yelp among other Internet favorites.

When broker dealers sell IPOs, there is a process in place for soliciting customer interest. Prior to the effective date of the registration statement, firms may only obtain an “indication of interest” from customers. An “indication of interest” is not a purchase. In order for an “indication of interest” to result in a purchase the investor must reconfirm their interest after the IPO registration statement becomes effective. Broker dealers may also solicit what is known as “conditional offers to buy.” This differs from an “indication of interest” in that the investor does not have to reconfirm. It may bind the customer after the registration statement becomes effective if the investor simply takes no action to revoke the conditional offer before the brokerage firm accepts it. According to FINRA, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney failed to institute adequate procedures and properly train its employees to ensure that its staff clearly differentiated an “indication of interest” from a “conditional offer” in their solicitation of potential investors.

Morgan Stanley Smith Barney actually adopted a policy related to the solicitation of IPO’s. In adopting this policy back on February 16, 2012, however, the firm used the terms “indication of interest” and “conditional offer” interchangeably, which implicitly disregarded the need for customer reconfirmation prior to trade execution. According to FINRA, Morgan Stanley never provided its sales teams and financial advisers any education or materials explaining the differences in terminology. As a consequence there was a strong possibility that neither the Morgan Stanley staff nor its customers properly understood the type of order that was being solicited. In addition, FINRA found that Morgan Stanley’s inadequate policies failed to comply with the federal securities laws and other FINRA rules.