Securities Attorney

New York State Fines AXA Equitable $20 Million Over Variable Annuity Products

April 23, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced on March 17, 2014, that AXA Equitable (AXA) agreed to a consent order to pay a $20 million fine to the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) for violations relating to certain variable annuity products. The DFS investigation uncovered that AXA made changes to certain variable annuity products that limited potential returns for existing customers without providing adequate notice to New York. New York stated that AXA’s omissions limited the DFS’ ability to protect consumer by requiring existing customers to affirmatively “opt in” to the altered product rather than remaining in that investment by default. According to New York, AXA’s actions affected tens of thousands of New Yorkers with variable annuity products at AXA.

A variable annuity is complex bundled financial and insurance product. A variable annuity is a contract with an insurance company where the insurer agrees to make periodic payments to you and the investor chooses the investments made in the annuity. The value of your variable annuity will vary depending on the performance of the investment options chosen. The investment options for a variable annuity are usually mutual funds.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) released a publication entitled: Variable Annuities: What You Should Know. In the publication, the SEC encouraged investors considering a purchase of a variable annuity to “ask your insurance agent, broker, financial planner, or other financial professional lots of questions about whether a variable annuity is right for you.” Often times the benefits of variable annuities are outweighed by the other provisions including surrender charges, mortality and expense charges, management fees, and rider costs. Variable annuities are also high sales commission products for financial advisors and sometimes advisors push these products on persons who do not need them or cannot benefit from them. For example, since an IRA account is already tax deferred it makes little sense to use an IRA account to hold a variable annuity investment.

Bill Tatro and Mary Helen Caprice Mallett Accused of Selling Unsuitable Private Placements Securities Part II

April 1, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

This post continues our investigation into the recent bar of broker William (Bill) Tatro by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and his relationship with Mary Helen Caprice Mallett (Mallett), Tatro’s wife, colleague, and business partner.

Mallett has also had a large number of customer complaints initiated against her. Mallett’s BrokerCheck reveals that she was associated with First Allied at roughly the same time as Tatro. Thereafter, from September 2010 until May 2011, Mallett was associated with Morgan Stanley Smith Barney (Morgan Stanley). From 2011 until June 2013, Mallett was associated with Independent Financial Group, LLC. Mallett is also associated or is involved in Biltmore Wealth Advisors, LLC, Capital Financial Management, Ltd, South Race Street, LLC, Red Rock, LLC, Mango Lizard LLC, and EZ Plan LLC.

In April 2011, Morgan Stanley filed a Form U5 taking the position that Mallett “engaged in outside business activities without prior written approval of [Morgan Stanley] and facilitated clients’ relationships with an outside investment manager”, believed to be Tatro, “who was not approved by or affiliated with [Morgan Stanley].” According to a lawsuit Morgan Stanley filed against Mallett she told Morgan Stanley that she and Tatro had used the same investment strategy over the previous nine years, presumably while associated with First Allied, and that she had bought Tatro’s book of business. However, Morgan Stanley charged that Mallett had falsely told them Tatro was no longer servicing his former clients.

Allen Olander of Centaurus Financial Sanctioned Over Variable Annuity Sales

March 31, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) sanctioned broker Allen B. Olander (Olander) of Centaurus Financial, Inc. (Centaurus) concerning allegations that Olander failed to disclose an IRS lien on his Form U4, borrowed money from a customer, and made unsuitable recommendations in the sale and exchange of variable annuities. This is the second Centaurus broker that we have recently reported has been sanctioned.

Olander first became registered as an registered broker in 1993. Olander holds a Series 6 license that allows him to sell only open end mutual funds and variable annuities. From October 2007, to July 2011, Olander was associated with Centaurus. Olander’s BrokerCheck discloses that customers have filed at least 12 complaints against Olander concerning his conduct in handling their accounts. Many of the complaints involve the suitability or failure to disclose certain risks and features of variable annuities.

FINRA found that in May 2011, Olander received a lien by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the amount of $42,465. According to FINRA, Olander failed to amend his Form U4 to disclose the lien. Disclosure of tax liens is important for investors because it lets the public know that the broker has had financial difficulties managing their own affairs and may be tempted to recommend products and services that are overly expensive in order to satisfy debts.

JP Turner Sanctioned By FINRA Over Non-Traditional ETF Sales and Mutual Fund Switches

March 20, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) ordered J.P. Turner & Company, L.L.C. (JP Turner) to pay $707,559 in restitution to 84 customers for sales of unsuitable leveraged and inverse exchange-traded funds (Non-Traditional ETFs) and for excessive mutual fund switches. The current fine and is just one of several sanctions that regulators have brought against JP Turner brokers concerning the firms sales and supervisory practices.

Brad Bennett, FINRA Executive Vice President and Chief of Enforcement, was quoted in the settlement stating that “Securities firms and their registered reps must understand the complex products they are selling and the risks inherent to the products, and be able to determine if they are suitable for investors before recommending them to retail customers.”

As a background, Non-Traditional ETFs are novel products that have grown significantly in popularity since 2006. By 2009, over 100 Non-Traditional ETFs existed in the market place with total assets of approximately $22 billion. A leveraged ETF seeks to deliver two or three times an index or benchmark return the ETF tracks. Non-Traditional ETFs can also be “inverse” or “short” meaning that the investment returns the opposite of the performance the index or benchmark. While both ETFs and Non-Traditional ETFs track indexes, Non-Traditional ETFs contain significant risks that are not associated with traditional ETFs. Non-Traditional ETFs have additional risks of daily reset, use of leverage, and compounding.

Silver Oak Securities Fined Over Non-Traditional ETF Sales

March 12, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) sanctioned brokerage firm Silver Oak Securities, Inc. (Silver Oak) concerning allegations from January 2009, to December 2010, Silver Oak failed to establish and maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws regarding the sale of leveraged and inverse Exchange-Traded Funds (Non-Traditional ETFs). Silver Oak has been a FINRA member since 2007 and is in Jackson, Tennessee, and employs 122 registered individuals at 28 branch offices.

Non-Traditional ETFs have grown significantly in popularity since 2006. By 2009, over 100 Non-Traditional ETFs had been issued with total assets under management of approximately $22 billion. A leveraged ETF seeks to deliver two or three times an index or benchmark return the ETF tracks. Non-Traditional ETFs can also be “inverse” or “short” returning the opposite of the performance the index or benchmark. Non-Traditional ETFs contain significant risks that are not found in traditional ETFs. Non-Traditional ETFs have risks associated with a daily reset, use of leverage, and compounding.

In addition, the performance of Non-Traditional ETFs over long periods of time tend to differ significantly from the performance of the underlying index or benchmark the fund tracks. For example, between December 2008, and April 2009, the Dow Jones U.S. Oil & Gas Index gained two percent while a leveraged ETF that tracked the index’s daily return fell six percent. Another related leveraged ETF seeking to deliver twice the inverse of the index’s daily return fell by 26 percent. These risks, among others, prompted FINRA to issue a Notice to Members clarifying brokerage firm obligations when selling Non-Traditional ETFs to customers.

FINRA Alleges Royal Securities Company Failed to Supervise the Sale of Church Investments – Part II

March 6, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

This article continues the findings of The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that led to sanctions against Royal Securities Company (Royal Securities) concerning allegations Royal lacked adequate supervision and controls in several areas. FINRA found that from 2009 through 2011, Royal Securities failed to establish adequate supervisory systems to ensure due diligence, training, and fair pricing of church bonds and funds sold by its representatives.

FINRA alleged that Royal Securities acted as the lead underwriter for three churches who were issuing church bonds. From May 2009, through October 2011, according to FINRA Royal Securities sold approximately $4.3 million in church bonds to customers. FINRA also found that Royal Securities was also involved in the sale of secured certificates of participation in a fund that raised capital for Christian churches. The church fund was sold primarily by another broker-dealer but FINRA found that Royal Securities had a secondary clearing arrangement with the broker-dealer where 151 church fund sales occurred in 65 accounts with a total of approximately $2,908,000 in sales.

FINRA found that Royal Securities failed to adopt reasonable written supervisory procedures and supervisory controls to govern church bonds and church funds lines of business. Specifically, FINRA found that Royal Securities procedures did not address specific suitability considerations, particularly supervision of issues, or any required due diligence of church bonds underwritten.

Matrix Capital and Christopher Anci Sanctioned by FINRA Over Variable Annuity Practices

February 27, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

In or about May 2010, a registered representative who concentrated in variable annuities became registered with Matrix Capital Group, Inc. (Matrix) and remained with Matrix until April 2011. According to FINRA, during a one year period the representative recommended 17 customers surrender their existing variable annuities and replace them with another annuity product. FINRA alleged that each customer purchased a new annuity and paid a surrender charge of at least $1,000. In sum, FINRA found that in total the customers paid a total of $70,000 in surrender charges. In addition, FINRA alleged that in 16 of the 17 transactions, the customer forfeited significant death and/or living benefits through the switch.

Matrix’s primary business involved equity agency transactions, mostly for institutional customers and high net worth individuals. Christopher Anci (Anci) joined Matrix in 1996. He has been dually registered with three other firms at various times while registered with Matrix. Anci has been President and a director of Matrix Capital Group since 2004.

As President of the Matrix, Anci had overall supervisory responsibility for the firm’s operations. Also, during the time Anci served as Chief Compliance Officer, until November 2010, Anci was designated in the firm’s written supervisory procedures as the person responsible for reviewing and approving variable annuity sales and exchanges. Even after Matrix hired a new Chief Compliance Officer, according to FINRA Anci remained responsible for the supervision and review of variable annuity transactions.

Gana LLP Investigates Alleged Fraudulent Activity Related to Credit Suisse’s TVIX Notes

February 21, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

Gana Weinstein LLP, a full-service nationally recognized securities litigation firm, is investigating Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC for underwriting and VLS Securities, LLC (VLS) for marketing the VelocityShares Daily 2x VIX Short Term Exchange Traded Notes (TVIX). According to TVIX’s offering documents and marketing materials, TVIX was linked to twice the daily performance of the S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures Index. The offering documents stated that TVIX was designed for investors who seek exposure to the applicable underlying index.

TVIX do not represent ownership in any basket of securities, instead TVIX acts as a debt instrument that is supposed to track an index and on which the issuer pays the note based on the terms of the offering documents. As a result, investors may receive a cash payment at maturity. TVIX began trading on November 30, 2013 at a $100 per share price. On February 21, 2012, Credit Suisse temporarily suspended the issuance of new shares of TVIX, due to internal limits reached on the size of TVIX, according to Credit Suisse.

On March 22, 2012, the TVIX shares decline in price by over 29% as rumors were circulating that Credit Suisse was considering whether to begin reissuing shares of TVIX. On March 23, 2012 after Credit Suisse announced that it would reopen issuance of TVIX, the shares dropped another 30% in value.

Will I Win My FINRA Securities Arbitration Claim?

February 19, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

One of the most common questions I receive as a FINRA securities attorney is whether or not a client is likely to prevail at a FINRA arbitration hearing. My first gut reaction, and the one I tell clients, is honestly I just don’t know. Most clients are puzzled by this answer because after handling hundreds of arbitration claims one would think I would have a better sense and certainty as to the strength of the case. However, the answer to whether the client would win at arbitration is not just a function of the strength of the case.

The better way to phrase the question is: What is the likely outcome of my securities case? That question is more readily answerable. I tell clients that it has been our experience that approximately 80% of all cases filed will be resolved through settlement or other means sometime prior to hearing. Recent data released by FINRA supports that approximately 80% of cases never make it to hearing. According to FINRA, of all arbitrations decided between 2009 and 2013 between 75% and 79% of those claims are resolved either through settlement, withdrawn, or means other than a hearing.

But what of the 20% of cases that do go to hearing? What are the chances of success at the FINRA arbitration hearing? The answer to that question is again usually unknowable at the time it’s first asked. There are so many considerations that go into determining the likelihood of success, many of which are unknown at the outset. Once of the biggest unknowns at the outset is who the arbitrators will be.

UBS Peurto Rico Bond Funds Vulnerable as S&P Downgrades Puerto Rico Debt to “Junk”

February 4, 2014 | by Staff Attorney

According to Bloomberg News Puerto Rico’s general obligation bonds were cut one step to speculative grade, otherwise known as “junk” status, by Standard & Poor’s citing reduced access to liquidity. The territory has $16.2 billion of debt as of June 30, according to the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico. Investors nationwide are expected to be effected as about 70 percent of U.S. municipal mutual funds own Puerto Rico securities according to Morningstar Inc. However, investors in Puerto Rico bond funds that were heavily invested in Puerto Rico debt are expected to be hit the hardest.

As we previously reported, a credit rating agency downgrade followed by a default or restructuring of Puerto Rico’s debt seems inevitable. How did Puerto Rico end up here? Unfortunately, its the same familiar Wall Street drama that is now perfectly mirroring the mortgage securities crisis experienced only six years ago. Wall Street firms sell Puerto Rico bonds as safe, tax-free, high-yielding investments and politicians and policy makers take no interest in stopping the underwriting, issuance, and debt selling machine. Moreover, firms know that by packaging unloved and unwanted municipal bonds and other assets into mutual funds the firms can sell speculative assets to retirees and other investors seeking income as conservative and diversified bond funds.

Firms such UBS, sold proprietary bond funds to customer such as the Puerto Rico Fixed Income Fund and the Puerto Rico Investors Tax-Free Fund series that invested up to 140% of their assets in Puerto Rico debt through the employment of leverage. While UBS recommends that Puerto Rico residents should, in some cases, invest up to 100%+ of their assets in the Funds, UBS secretly recommends that UBS Puerto Rico, the firm’s island subsidiary, liquidate its own UBS bond fund holdings due to UBS the overconcentration risk. Thus, according to complaints filed against the firm, UBS’ recommendation to clients to invest in the funds was a conflict of interests with the firm’s own internal analysis that found the funds to be too risky.