Articles Posted in Private Placements

shutterstock_128856874This post continues our firm’s investigation concerning the recent allegations brought by The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) sanctioning brokerage firm World Equity Group, Inc. (World Equity) concerning at least seven different allegations of supervisory failures that occurred between 2009 through 2012. FINRA’s allegations include failures to implement an adequate supervisory system and concerned both internal processes at the firm and procedures and in the handling of customer accounts in the areas of suitability of transactions in non-traditional ETFs, private placements, and non-traded REITs.

FINRA requires firms preserve for at least 6 years all communications relating to its business and to provide for ways to store electronic media. FINRA found that in May 2011, the World Equity opened a new branch office at 311 W. Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois. FINRA alleged that errors in the process of transferring several representatives at that branch to World Equity emails of the representatives were not maintained and preserved before April 13, 2012. In addition, FINRA found that the firm failed to maintain business related emails for ten representatives who used their personal emails for business purposes.

FINRA also alleged that World Equity failed to conduct due diligence in connection with private placements offering from July 2009, through January 2012. During that time FINRA alleged that the firm conducted at least eight private placements including a product called Newport Digital Technologies, Inc. (NDT) and sold more than $6 million in these offerings. In addition, FINRA found that from August 23, 2010 to July 17, 2012 the firm conducted at least five Non-Traded REIT offerings and sold more than $3 million in these offerings.

shutterstock_168326705The law offices of Gana Weinstein LLP have been investigating the sales of Servergy, Inc. (Servergy) stock through a private placement by WFG Investments, Inc (WFG) to its clients. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently filed an action in the Northern District of Texas against Servergy concerning possible violations of the anti-fraud provisions of federal and state securities laws. Between August 2009 and February 2013, Servergy raised approximately $26 million by selling shares of its common stock to private investors

Servergy is a Nevada company headquartered in Texas formed in August 2009. The company’s main product is the developing and manufacturing the Cleantech 1000 Server (CTS-1000), technology that can be used in network function virtualization, distributed storage, and cloud computing. The SEC’s Servergy lawsuit concerns misstatements made by Servergy’s CEO, William Mapp III, to investment advisors and investors regarding Servergy’s prospects. Specifically, it was alleged that the company made statements indicating that Freescale Semiconductor had previously ordered CTS-1000 servers, that Amazon.com, Inc. had pre-ordered the server, and that the CTS-1000 consumes 80% less power, cooling, and space than its competitors.

However, according to the SEC, there was no evidence to back up that Mapp’s statements that Freescale’s ever placed such orders of the CTS-1000. The SEC also alleged that the claims concerning pre-orders from Amazon for the CTS-1000 did not exist. Finally, the SEC alleged that there were errors in a chart titled “Comparing Servergy to the Blade Server Competition” that was included in one of the Company’s private placement memoranda.

shutterstock_20354398The law offices of Gana Weinstein LLP is investigating a series of complaints against broker William Sheehan (Sheehan). According to Sheehan’s BrokerCheck records the broker has been the subject of 7 investor complaints since 2010. That many claims against one broker is rare. According to InvestmentNews, only about 12% of financial advisors have any type of disclosure event on their records. Thus the number of brokers receiving eight complaints is exceedingly small.

The complaints concerning Sheehan’s activities at several brokerage firms. From July 2004, through October 2007, Sheehan was associated with Investors Capital Corp. (ICC) Next, from October 2007 until January 2010, Sheehan was a registered representative of Omni Brokerage, Inc. Thereafter, Sheehan went back to ICC until October 2012. Finally, Sheehan is currently registered with DFPG Investments, Inc.

Many of the complaints against Sheehan involve allegations investment recommendations into real estate securities and limited partnership interests in tenants-in-common (TICs). TIC investments have come under fire by the customers and even within the securities industry. Indeed, due to the failure of the TIC investment strategy as a whole across the securities industry, TIC investments have virtually disappeared as offered investments.   According to InvestmentNews “At the height of the TIC market in 2006, 71 sponsors raised $3.65 billion in equity from TICs and DSTs…TICs now are all but extinct because of the fallout from the credit crisis.” In fact, TIC recommendations have been a major contributor to bankrupting several brokerage firms. For example, InvestmentNews found that 43 of the 92 broker-dealers that sold TICs sponsored by DBSI Inc., a company whose executives were later charged with running a Ponzi scheme, a staggering 47% of firms that sold DBSI are no longer in business.

shutterstock_132317306As recently reported in Reuters, oil and gas companies such as Reef Oil & Gas Partners, Black Diamond, and Discovery Resources & Development LLC have marketed themselves to investors as a way to get into the U.S. energy boom. These companies issue private placement partnership that will drill for oil and gas and pay investors the profits that will result. However, oil and gas private placements contain substantial risks that often outweigh any potential benefits including securities fraud, conflicts of interests, high transaction / sales costs, and investment risk. Due to these risks investors often lose money while issuers make handsome profits.

According to Reuters, of 34 deals Reef has issued since 1996, only 12 have paid out more cash to investors than they initially contributed. In addition, Reuters found that Reef sold an additional 31 smaller deals between 1996 and 2010 collecting $146 million for itself while paying out investors a paltry $55 million.

Under the terms of one Reef deal, investors raised $50 million and Reef immediately took $7.5 million for fees and broker commissions. After that, Reef received a monthly management fee of $41,667 from the fund. Reef also charged for drilling, operating, legal, and other expenses to the fund. Reef completely controlled these expenses and determined which other Reef entities would be hired to do work for the venture. In fact, no more than half of the money would be used to buy oil and gas land where there were reserves.

shutterstock_114128113Our firm has written numerous times about investor losses in programs such as various equipment leasing programs like LEAF Equipment Leasing Income Funds I-IV and ICON Leasing Funds Eleven and Twelve. These direct participation programs, like their non-traded REIT and oil and gas cousins, all suffer from the same crippling flaw that dooms these investments to a high likelihood of failure from the get go. The costs and fees associated with all of these investments cause the security to be so costly that only unprecedented market boom conditions can lead to profitability. Market stagnation or decline makes any significant return a virtual impossibility.

Yet, investors are in no way compensated for these additional risks. These investments tout high yield like returns for risks far in excess of traditional high yield investments. In fact, the only reason brokers sell these products is because of the high sales commissions coupled with the lack of price transparency that allows these products to be displayed at inflated values for years on investor account statements.

In an equipment leasing program a sponsor sells limited partnership units then takes out substantial offering costs and fees and invests the remainder in a pool of equipment leases that are leveraged up with additional borrowing. Brokers market these products as a predictable income stream but in fact, and what nearly all brokers fail to mention, is that a substantial portion of investor distributions are actually a return of their original investment and not actually income generated from operations.

shutterstock_146470052This article follows up on a recent article reported in Reuters concerning Atlas Energy LP’s private placement partnerships in oil and gas. Atlas Resources LLC, a subsidiary the energy group, has filed documents with the SEC for Atlas Resources Series 34-2014 LP stating that it seeks to raise as much as $300 million by Dec. 31 of 2014. The deal allows investors to participate in investments where advances in drilling technology have turned previously inaccessible reservoirs of oil into viable prospects. In addition, Atlas promises to invest up to $145 million of its own capital alongside investors.

In the last article we explored how the house seems more likely to win on these deals over investors. But beyond the inherent risks with speculating on oil and gas and unknown oil deposits most investors don’t realize the deals are often unfair to investors. In a normal speculative investment as the investment risk goes up the investor demands greater rewards to compensate for the additional risk. However, with oil and gas private placements the risks are sky high and the rewards simply don’t match up.

In order to counter this criticism, issuers say that the tax benefits of their deals where the investor can write off more than 90 percent of their initial outlay the year they make it helps defray the risk and increase the value proposition. First, the same tax advantage claims are often nominal compared to the principal risk of loss of the investment as seen by Puerto Rican investors in the UBS Bond Funds who have now seen their investments decline by 50% or more in some cases. Second, often times brokers sell oil and gas investments indiscriminately to the young and old who have lower incomes and cannot take advantage of the tax benefits.

shutterstock_103610648As recently reported in Reuters, Atlas Energy LP has marketed itself to investors as a way to get into the U.S. energy boom. By contributing at least $25,000 in a private placement partnership that will drill for oil and gas in states such as Texas, Ohio, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania and share in revenues generated from the wells. Atlas Resources LLC, a subsidiary the energy group, has filed documents with the SEC for Atlas Resources Series 34-2014 LP stating that it seeks to raise as much as $300 million by Dec. 31 of 2014. The deal sounds good when pitched: participate in investments where advances in drilling technology have turned previously inaccessible reservoirs of fossil fuels into potentially viable prospects and to boot Atlas will invest up to $145 million of its own capital alongside investors. Through this method and similar deals, oil and gas projects have issued nearly 4,000 private placements since 2008 seeking to raise as much as $122 billion.

But before you take the plunge a review of the Atlas’s offering memorandum reveals some red flags and given Atlas’ past failure rate investors should think twice. First, up to $45 million of the money raised will be paid to Atlas affiliate Anthem Securities that will then be turned over to as commissions to broker-dealers who pitch the deal to investors. Up to $39 million more will be used to buy drilling leases from another affiliate. Think investors will get a fair price on the leases when Atlas controls both sides of the deal? More conflicts ahead as Atlas affiliated suppliers may also get up to $53 million for buying drilling and transport equipment. Next, an additional $8 million of Atlas’s investment is a 15 percent markup on estimated equipment costs. Finally, Atlas will pay itself nearly $52 million in various other fees and markups.

In sum, at least 40% of Atlas’s $145 million investment alongside mom and pop goes right back to the company. In addition, Atlas’ profits don’t stop there, when the venture starts generating revenue Atlas is entitled to 33% before accounting for those payments and markups. In the end, not much of a risk at all for Atlas.

shutterstock_178801067This article continues the examination of the findings by The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), in an acceptance, waiver, and consent action (AWC), concerning LaSalle St. Securities, LLC (LaSalle) private placement deficiencies.  FINRA also found that LaSalle served as the placement agent for a 2009 private placement offering by Revitalight Operators, LLC. The private placement memorandum (PPM) stated investors would be entitled to a 9% “preferred return” on their outstanding investments prior but that this preferred return was not guaranteed and might never be paid. FINRA found that LaSalle was responsible for the PPM’s contents. The PPM contained a summary of financial projections which FINRA found contained assumptions that the total net return over six years would be $2.050 million and that investors’ capital contributions would be returned in the fiftieth month. The PPM stated that investors could receive a 27.13% annual return on investment. However, FINRA determined that the projected annual return were calculated using a flawed methodology.

Finally, FINRA alleged that member firms that using consolidated reports are communications with the public and must be clear, accurate, and not misleading. Firms should have systems in place to ensure that valuations provided regarding customer assets held at the firm are consistent with the firm’s official account statement distributed to the customer. The firm should also take reasonable steps to accurately reflect information regarding outside accounts and assets. If a firm is unable to adequately supervise the use of the reports then the firm must prohibit dissemination of the reports.

FINRA found that LaSalle had procedures in place governing consolidated reports. The procedures provided that the CCO or specifically designated principals, will review the consolidated reports to ensure adherence to all applicable rules. Despite the procedures, FINRA found that LaSalle had an inadequate system in place because the firm did not ensure that all representatives actually followed the proscribed procedures. FINRA determined that LaSalle’s training was limited to blast emails to brokers advising them that consolidated statements needed to be submitted to the home office for review as correspondence.

shutterstock_187532306The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), in an acceptance, waiver, and consent action (AWC), sanctioned brokerage firm LaSalle St. Securities, LLC (LaSalle) over allegations that staff found certain deficiencies with respect to: 1) a private placement offering involving Seat Exchange Corporation where LaSalle failed to exercise adequate due diligence before allowing a broker to recommend the offering to four investors; 2) a private offering by Revitalight Operators, LLC, LaSalle distributed a private placement memorandum to potential investors that did not include material facts and used a flawed methodology for projecting return on investment; 3) an offering of Platinum Wealth Partners, Inc. (PWP) by one of its brokers the firm failed to supervise; and 4) the fact that LaSalle allowed its representatives to send consolidated reports to its customers but failed to adequately supervise those reports.

LaSalle has been registered with FINRA as a broker-dealer since 1976, has 232 registered representatives, 107 branch offices, and its principal place of business is in Chicago, Illinois. LaSalle has various business lines.

FINRA alleged that in April 2010, a broker with the initials “PL” sought the firm’s approval to recommend the purchase of shares in Seat Exchange Corporation, a Regulation D private placement to four customers. Seat Exchange had only one director, who also owned 21.5% of the company and the placement agent for offering was Chicago Investment Group (CIG). CIG was also an affiliated with Seat Exchange. According to FINRA, LaSalle had supervisory procedures requiring that all appropriate due diligence efforts on behalf of any private placement offering are undertaken and documented or that we obtain sufficient documentation from a third party that they have undertaken sufficient due diligence.

shutterstock_175000886The law offices of Gana Weinstein LLP are investigating a series of claims before The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in relation to the conduct of financial advisor Robert Smith (Smith). Smith has been accused by at least 10 customers over his career concerning allegations that Smith overconcentrated the customer’s accounts in private placement securities including equipment leasing programs, oil & gas investments, and non-traded real estate investment trusts (Non-traded REITs).

Smith has been registered with several broker dealers over the years. Starting in 2000 Smith was registered with American General Securities (n/k/a SagePoint Financial, Inc.) until May 2006. Thereafter, Smith was associated with ProEquities, Inc. until June 2010. Finally, from June 2010, until June 2014, Smith was registered with Berthel, Fisher & Company Financial Services, Inc. (Berthel Fisher). Currently, Smith is not registered with any FINRA firm. Upon information and belief, from 2006 on Smith operated his securities business under a DBA called Proactive Retirement Investing.

The large number of complaints against Smith concerning the same or similar charges of misconduct is unusual in the brokerage industry. Most brokers go their entire careers without a single complaint. A small number have one or two complaints. But only a tiny percentage have more than two customer complaints. Here, at least 10 customers have made allegations against Smith all concerning difficult to value private placement securities.

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