Articles Posted in Private Placements

On May 3, 2013 the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) filed a complaint against Commonwealth Capital Securities Corp. (CCSC) and Kimberly Springsteen-Abbott, owner, chief executive, and head of compliance for CCSC, for misusing investor funds.  CCSC employs about 22 registered representatives and sells private placements and direct investments.  Since 1993, CCSC marketed and sold 13 different equipment leasing funds raising $240 million for various technology equipment leases. The technology leases were supposed to have durations of 12 to 36 months.

Instead, according to FINRA, from December 2008 until February 2012, Kimberley Springsteen-Abbot misused investor funds to pay for various personal credit card charges and other expenses totaling at least $334,798.  Some of those personal expenses include a $1,971 family vacation in 2010, and a $12,414 board of directors meeting in Hawaii in 2010.  In total, FINRA alleges that 2,272 credit card charges related to misuse of funds.

In addition, FINRA alleges that during the agency’s examination in 2011, Kimberley Springsteen-Abbot and CCSC falsified and backdated a memo accounting for tickets to Disney World.  Kimberley Springsteen-Abbot’s and CCSC’s manipulations of the records caused the brokerage firm’s books and records to be inaccurate.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has settled a dispute with vFinance investments, Inc. (vFinance) concerning several violations of the securities laws including selling private placements in violation of the securities laws, failure to supervise, failure to disclose that the firm had worked with a statutorily disqualified person, and failure to retain and review email communications.

vFinance has been a FINRA member since 1998 has approximately 8 branch offices and employs about 40 registered representatives.  The recent settlement is not the first time vFinance has been investigated by regulators.  According to CRD records, there have been a total of 16 SEC, state, and FINRA regulatory actions initiated against vFinance in the past ten years.

The recent FINRA allegations concern several alleged violations.  First, FINRA alleged that vFinance violated Regulation M.  Regulation M is intended to prevent manipulative practices in the course of a securities offering by persons with an interest in the outcome by preventing conduct that could artificially influence a security’s market.  In this case, FINRA alleged that vFinance representatives solicited nearly $6 million from investors for the PERF Go-Green Holdings, Inc. (PGOG) private placement.  During the offering period, vFinance placed the PGOG’s common stock on the firm’s restricted list in order to avoid any potential conflict.  However, despite the PGOG being placed on the firm’s restricted list, 22 customers of two representatives have been accused of selling 255,300 shares of the common stock of PGOG when the issuer was on the firm’s restricted list.

David Mickelson has been accused by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) of improperly selling approximately $8.3 million worth of various private placements to at least 71 customers without informing his brokerage firm (a practice known as “selling away“).

From 2004 through May 2011, Mickelson was associated with NFP Securities, Inc. (NFP).  Mickelson’s private placement sales during this time included investments in Micro Pipe Fund I, LLC (Micro Pipe Fund), The Nutmeg Fund/Michael Fund LLLP, The Nutmeg/Fortuna Fund, LP, the Nutmeg/Patriot Fund, LLLP, and Lone Wolf, Inc.  FINRA alleged that Mickelson created Micro Pipe Capital Management, LLC, Mickelson Investment Management, LLC, Hannahlu Ventures, LP, and DFM Agency, LLC in order to manage the various private placement offerings.

In order to promote his private placements, Mickelson allegedly marketed Micro Pipe Fund and other investments using misleading websites and advertisements communicated to customers using email accounts not monitored by NFP.  Mickelson’s websites included: mickelsoninvestmentmanagement.com/mickinvest.com; astuteasset.com; and mickelsonlife.com.  These websites contained securities-related communications including detailed discussions of private investment in public equity (PIPE) funds.

The brokerage firm Advanced Equities, Inc. (Advanced Equities) specialized in so called late-stage private equity private placements.  Advanced Equities had been particularly active in the clean-tech space.  Through First Allied Securities, Inc. (First Allied), Advanced Equities private placements including Advanced Equities GreenTech Investments, LLC, AEI 2007 Venture Investments, LLC, AEI 2010 Cleantech Venture, LLC, and AEI Fisker Investments, LLC, were sold to hundreds of investors.  Customers have alleged that First Allied misrepresented the Advanced Equities private placements to investors and failed to conduct adequate due diligence concerning the offerings.

In 2007, First Allied was acquired by Advanced Equities Financial Corp. (AEF) and became a sister corporation to Advanced Equities.  At the time of the merger, Advanced Equities employed about 80 registered representatives while First Allied employed over 1,000 brokers.  Utilizing First Allied’s customer and broker resources, AEI vastly expanded marketing of private placements to First Allied customers.

Sales materials developed for Advanced Equities and presented to investors touted the private placements as “late stage equities” or companies that were 12-36 months from going public through an initial public offering (IPO).  The private placements were also represented as providing “higher near-term investment returns than the public equity markets” while possessing “greater short-term liquidity and lower risk profiles.”

Investors continue to suffer substantial losses from recommended investments in the Behringer Harvard REIT Funds.  The Behringer Harvard REIT Funds including the Behringer Harvard Mid-Term Value Enhancement I, Behringer Harvard Short-Term Opportunity Fund I, and the Behringer Harvard REIT I  and II (Behringer REITs) have sometimes been sold to investors as safe, stable, income producing real estate investment trusts.  While the Behringer REITs were initially sold to investors for $10 per share, currently some of these REITs trade as low as approximately $2.00 on the secondary market.  Worse still, some of the funds no longer pay a dividend or investors receive only a fraction of what their advisor initially told their clients they could expect the investment to yield.

The Behringer REITs are speculative securities, non-traded, and offered only through a Regulation D private placement.  Unlike traditional registered mutual funds or publicly traded REITs that have a published daily Net Asset Value (NAV) and trade on a national stock exchange, the Behringer REITs raised money through private placement offerings and are illiquid securities.  In recent years, increased volatility in stocks has led to an increasing number of advisor recommendations to invest in non-traded REITs as a way to invest in a stable income producing investment.  Some non-traded REITs have even claimed to offer stable returns while the real estate market has undergone extreme volatility.  Brokers are often motivated to sell non-traded REITs to clients due to the large commissions that can be earned in the selling the Behringer REITs.

Investors are now bringing claims against the brokerage firms that sold them the Behringer REITs alleging that their advisor failed to disclose important risks of the REITs.  Some common risks that customers have alleged were not disclosed include failing to explain that Behringer REITs may not be liquidated for up to 8 to 12 years or more, that the redemption policy can be eliminated at any time, and that investor returns may not come from funds generated through operations but can include a return of investor capital.

James R. Glover reached a settlement with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) resulting in a permanent bar from the securities industry.  Glover failed to appear and participate in FINRA’s investigation of his securities activities.

The FINRA complaint alleges that while Glover was employed by Signator Investors, Inc. (Signator), Glover misappropriated customer funds and sold unregistered securities products in violation of the securities laws.

From 1998 through May 2012, Glover was associated with Signtor.  During this time, it has been alleged that Glover sold interests in private placements, limited liability companies, and real estate related ventures.  Glover’s CRD lists that Glover is also employed by GW Financial Group, Inc.  In addition to FINRA’s sanctions against Glover, at least 25 customer complaints have been filed against Signator for the firm’s failure to supervise Glover’s business activities.  Nearly all of the customer complaints accuse Glover of selling fraudulent real estate related securities and of mishandling the customer’s accounts.

Investors have filed a class action complaint against Berthel Fisher & Co. Financial Services Inc. (Berthel Fisher) and CEO and founder Thomas Berthel for allegedly failing to perform due diligence on the Thompson National Properties (TNP) 2008 Participating Notes Program.  TNP 2008 is a non-traded Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) created by Anthony Thompson in 2008.

Unlike traded REITs, non-traded REITs do not trade on a securities exchange, are illiquid for eight years or more, have high broker commissions and fees, and are exposed to greater risks.  In recent years, increased volatility in stock markets led many brokers to recommend REITs to investors as a way to invest in a stable income producing investment.  Some non-traded REITs have claimed to offer stable returns while the real estate market has undergone extreme volatility.  Both the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) have recently noted that REITs may not be as safe and stable as sometimes claimed.  In a Investor Alert, FINRA noted that a common sales tactic of brokers is to sell non-traded REITs claiming that they are able to eliminate volatility.  However, since the REITs often determines the value of their own assets, investors may simply not be informed about the declining value of their investment.

The complaint against Berthel Fisher was filed on July 8, 2013 in the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Iowa.  Berthel Fisher was TNP 2008’s underwriter and managing broker-dealer.  Berthel Fisher has been being accused of simply ignoring and failing to investigate red flags that pointed to misrepresentations and omissions.  In addition, the complaint also alleges that Berthel Fisher’s TNP 2008 due diligence failures allowed the fund to act like a Ponzi scheme by paying old investors through funds raised by new investors.  According to the complaint, Berthel Fisher managed to raise more than $26 million from 200 investors.  However, the complaint alleges that Berthel Fisher provided many investors with outdated offering materials that misled investors and hid the catastrophic losses TNP had already suffered while soliciting new investor capital.

On July 12, 2013, Sunset Financial Services, Inc. (Sunset) reached a settlement with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) concerning allegations that Sunset failed to supervise the sale of certain private placement securities.  FINRA accused Sunset of failing to establish and maintain appropriate supervisory systems in compliance with FINRA rules regarding the sale of private placements.

The FINRA complaint alleges that the improper activity took place between January 2008 and March 2011.  Sunset began private placement investment sales in 2001 and in 2004 the fund at issue was approved for sale to customers by Sunset.  The private placement provided bridge loans for short-term mortgages for properties in California and Arizona.  Sunset was paid 2% of sales plus trail concessions from the fund.  In 2008, Sunset made $1.14 million form the total $57 million raised for the private placement.

According to FINRA, the first red flag indicating that the private placements were not as safe as the firm was advertising to customers occurred in 2008.   At that time, a third party published a report on that highlighted that the mortgages the fund invested in had experienced a 20% increase in the rate of default.  Sunset failed to follow up on the report such as re-evaluating the adequacy of keeping the fund on an approved sales list.  The second red flag occurred from 2008-2009 when the private placement no longer allowed fund redemptions due to financial difficulties. It was also later discovered that the CEO of the private placement was also the son of a registered representative of Sunset.

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